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BY ARTHUR S. LEONARD
T wo federal district judg-es and a US magistrate judge have issued new rulings — largely ad-
verse to the government — in law-
suits challenging the Trump ad-
ministration’s policy to ban military 
service by transgender individuals.
After the San Francisco-based 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
fused to lift Seattle District Judge 
Marsha Pechman’s preliminary in-
junction against the policy on July 
18, she issued a new ruling on July 
27 granting the plaintiffs’ motion to 
compel discovery and denying the 
government’s motion for a protec-
tive order that would shield Presi-
dent Donald Trump from having to 
respond to any discovery requests.
The Justice Department imme-
diately announced it would appeal 
this ruling to the Ninth Circuit. 
Pechman had previously denied 
motions for summary judgment in 
the case, having found that there 
was a need for discovery before such 
a ruling could take place.
On August 6, DC District Court 
Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, who 
had issued the fi rst preliminary in-
junction against the policy last year, 
issued two decisions. In one, she re-
jected the government’s request to 
vacate her preliminary injunction 
against Trump’s plan announced 
last summer as moot since Defense 
Secretary James Mattis, in Feb-
ruary, sent the president a memo 
outlining a “new” policy. Kollar-Ko-
telly agreed with Pechman that the 
“new” policy is not essentially differ-
ent from the “old” one Trump had 
articulated.
Kollar-Kotelly did, however, grant 
the government’s motion to dismiss 
Trump as an individual named de-
fendant in the case.
And, on August 14, Magistrate 
Judge A. David Copperthite, to 
whom Baltimore District Judge 
Marvin J. Garbis had referred dis-
covery matters in Stone v. Trump, 
another one of the pending cases, 
issued a ruling granting in part 
the plaintiffs’ motion to compel dis-
covery of deliberative materials in 
Trump and Mattis’ development of 
the new policy the administration is 
seeking to implement. 
Garbis has other motions to rule 
on in the case in Baltimore, and 
another suit challenging the pro-
posed transgender ban is pending 
in federal district court in Riverside, 
California, where the judge is con-
sidering motions similar to those 
fi led with Judges Pechman, Kollar-
Kotelly, and Garbis.
To recap for those coming late 
to this story, Trump tweeted a ban 
on transgender military service on 
July 26, 2017, and issued a memo-
randum a month later describing 
the policy in slightly more detail, 
tasking Secretary Mattis to pro-
pose a plan for implementation by 
late February 2018, with the goal of 
implementing the policy by March.
Trump’s memo specifi ed that 
Mattis’ previous directive to allow 
transgender applicants to join the 
military effective January 1, 2018, 
was to be indefi nitely delayed, since 
the president’s policy would not al-
low transgender people to enlist. 
When Trump issued his memo, Mat-
tis announced that no action would 
be taken against current transgen-
der personnel pending implementa-
tion of a new policy, but there were 
reports of trans service members 
seeing promotions and desired as-
signments canceled, as were some 
planned medical procedures.
Mattis’ memo to the president in 
February proposed some modifi ca-
tions to the policy Trump put for-
ward last August. Trans person-
nel who were already serving and 
had transitioned and were “stable” 
in their preferred gender would be 
allowed to continue serving, based 
on a determination that the invest-
ment in their training outweighed 
whatever “risk” they posed to mili-
tary readiness. Trans individuals 
who had not transitioned or been 
diagnosed with “gender dysphoria” 
would be allowed to enlist and serve, 
provided they refrained from tran-
sitioning and served in the gender 
identifi ed at birth. Otherwise, those 
diagnosed with “gender dysphoria” 
would be prohibited from enlisting 
or serving, and those who could not 
comply would be discharged.
The Mattis proposal was based on 
a “fi nding” — from a rigged special 
committee dominated by commit-
ted opponents of transgender ser-
vice — that allowing trans people to 
serve in the military is harmful to 
the operational effi ciency of the ser-
vice. This conclusion was based on 
no factual evidence and oblivious 
to the fact that transgender people 
had been serving openly without 
any problems since the Obama ad-
ministration lifted the prior ban at 
the end of June 2016. It also fl ew 
in the face of Pentagon conclusions 
that were the basis of the Obama 
policy change.
Four lawsuits had been fi led 
in response to the summer 2017 
policy announcement, and in a 
matter of months the four district 
courts had issued preliminary in-
junctions, having found it likely the 
plaintiffs would prevail on their ar-
gument that the policy violates the 
Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protec-
tion requirements. Given these in-
junctions, the Defense Department 
allowed trans people to submit ap-
plications to enlist beginning on 
January 1 of this year, after losing 
a last-ditch court battle to contin-
ue the enlistment ban. There have 
been reports, however, that the ap-
plications received are getting very 
slow processing, and all indications 
are that few have been accepted for 
service. 
 Trump responded to Mattis’ Feb-
ruary 2018 memo by “withdrawing” 
his prior memo and tweet and au-
thorizing Mattis to adopt the imple-
mentation plan he recommended. 
The Justice Department then fi led 
motions in all the lawsuits seeking 
to lift the preliminary injunctions. 
Their argument was, in part, that 
the “new” policy was suffi ciently 
different from the one that had 
been “withdrawn” as to moot the 
lawsuits. They further contended 
that the plaintiffs who were already 
serving and would be allowed to 
continue serving under the “new” 
policy no longer had standing to 
challenge the policy in court. And 
Justice argued that the plaintiffs’ 
attempts to conduct discovery in 
the case should be put on hold until 
there was a defi nitive appellate rul-
ing on the government’s motion to 
lift the preliminary injunctions.
On April 13, Judge Pechman re-
jected the government’s motion to 
lift the preliminary injunction, hav-
ing already ordered that discovery 
proceed. In his initial tweet, Trump 
claimed he had consulted with 
generals and other experts before 
adopting the policy, but the iden-
tities of these people were not re-
vealed and the government — mak-
ing generalized claims of executive 
privilege — has stonewalled any 
attempt to discover their identities 
or any internal executive branch 
documents that might have been 
generated on this issue.
Similarly, the February memo-
randum released under Mattis’ 
name did not identify any individu-
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als responsible for its development, 
and naturally the plaintiffs are 
also seeking to discover who was 
involved in putting it together and 
what information they purported to 
rely upon. 
Pechman’s July 27 order to com-
pel discovery specifi ed the materi-
als sought by the plaintiffs, and 
pointed out that under evidentiary 
rules any claim of executive privi-
lege against disclosure is subject to 
evaluation by the court.
“The deliberative privilege is not 
absolute,” she wrote. “Several courts 
have recognized that the privilege 
does not apply in cases involving 
claims of governmental misconduct 
or where the government’s intent is 
at issue.”
Under Ninth Circuit precedents 
governing Pechman’s decision-
making, the question is whether 
plaintiffs’ need for the materials 
and for accurate fact-fi nding over-
rides the government’s interest in 
non-disclosure. Factors involved in 
making that determination include 
the relevance of the evidence, the 
availability of other evidence, the 
government’s role in the litigation, 
and the risk that disclosure would 
hinder frank and independent dis-
cussion regarding contemplated 
policies and decisions. In invok-
ing privilege, the government must 
“provide precise and certain rea-
sons for preserving the confi denti-
ality of designated material.”
Pechman had previously de-
termined that discrimination be-
cause of gender identity involves 
a “suspect classifi cation” regard-
ing the Constitution’s requirement 
of equal protection, which means 
the government has the burden of 
proving that there is a compelling 
justifi cation for the discrimination. 
Here, however, the government has 
articulated only a generalized judg-
ment that service by transgender 
individuals is too “risky” based on 
no facts whatsoever. Pechman con-
cluded in granting the plaintiffs’ 
discovery motion that “the delibera-
tive process privilege does not apply 
in this case.”
The government had moved for a 
protective order “precluding discov-
ery directed at President Trump.” 
Even though the government con-
ceded that Trump has “not provided 
substantive responses or produced 
a privilege log” listing specifi cally 
what information has to be protect-
ed against disclosure, the Justice 
Department contended that “be-
cause the requested discovery rais-
es ‘separation of powers concerns,’” 
the plaintiffs must “exhaust discov-
ery ‘from sources other than the 
President and his immediate White 
House advisors and staff’ before he 
is required to formally invoke the 
privilege.”
Pechman noted that so far the 
government has refused to provide 
any information about how the 
policy decision was made and has 
failed to identify the specifi c docu-
ments and other information for 
which it claims privilege. In a foot-
note, she commented, “The Court 
notes that Defendants have stead-
fastly refused to identify even one 
general or military offi cial President 
Trump consulted before announc-
ing the ban.” As a result, she found, 
there was no basis for her to evalu-
ate “whether the privilege applies 
and if so, whether Plaintiffs have 
established a showing of need suf-
fi cient to overcome it.”
Indeed, in a prior decision, Pech-
man  concluded as far as the record 
stands, it looks as if Trump made 
the whole thing up himself without 
relying on any military expertise. 
From that perspective, she has pre-
liminarily rejected the government’s 
contention the policy is owed the 
deference normally extended to mil-
itary policies adopted based on the 
specialized training and expertise 
of Pentagon policy-makers.
Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s August 
6 ruling focused on an issue that 
Pechman had previously decided: 
whether the plaintiffs had standing 
to continue challenging the policy 
after Mattis’ memo supplanted 
the “withdrawn” earlier policy an-
nouncements. She had little trouble 
determining that all the plaintiffs 
— even those currently serving who 
would be allowed to continue serv-
ing under the “new” policy — still 
had standing, which requires a 
fi nding that implementing the pol-
icy would cause them harm.
“The Court rejects Defendants’ 
argument that Plaintiffs no longer 
have standing because they are not 
harmed by the Mattis Implemen-
tation Plan,” Kollar-Kotelly wrote, 
stating that “the effect of that plan 
would be that individuals who re-
quire or have undergone gender 
transition would be absolutely dis-
qualifi ed from military service, indi-
viduals with a history or diagnosis 
of gender dysphoria would be largely 
disqualifi ed from military service, 
and, to the extent that there are any 
individuals who identify as ‘trans-
gender’ but do not fall under the 
fi rst two categories, they would be 
allowed to serve, but only ‘in their 
biological sex’ (which means that 
openly transgender persons would 
generally not be allowed to serve in 
conformance with their identity).” 
In addition, those who have tran-
sitioned and are now serving would 
be doing so under the stigma of be-
ing labeled as “unfi t” for military 
service and presenting an undue 
risk to military readiness, and 
would likely suffer prejudice regard-
ing assignments and their treat-
ment by fellow service members, as 
well as emotional harm.
“The Mattis Implementation Plan 
sends a blatantly stigmatizing mes-
sage to all members of the mili-
tary hierarchy that has a unique 
and damaging effect on a narrow 
and identifi able set of individuals, 
of which Plaintiffs are members,” 
Kollar-Kotelly wrote. They would be 
serving “pursuant to an exception to 
a policy that explicitly marks them 
as unfi t for service. No other service 
members are so affl icted.  These 
Plaintiffs are denied equal treat-
ment because they will be the only 
service members who are allowed to 
serve only based on a technicality; 
as an exception to a policy that gen-
erally paints them as unfi t.” 
She pointed out that beyond stig-
matization, the Mattis plan “creates 
a substantial risk that Plaintiffs 
will suffer concrete harms to their 
careers in the near future. There is 
a substantial risk that the plan will 
harm Plaintiffs’ career development 
in the form of reduced opportunities 
for assignments, promotion, train-
ing, and deployment. These harms 
are an additional basis for Plaintiffs’ 
standing.”
Kollar-Kotelly rejected the govern-
ment’s contention that these harms 
were only “speculative.”
Agreeing with Judge Pechman, 
she rejected the claim that Trump’s 
“withdrawal” of his August 2017 
memorandum and the substitution 
of the Mattis plan made the exist-
ing lawsuits moot, fi nding that the 
“new” plan was merely a method of 
“implementing” the previously an-
nounced policy. The Mattis plan, 
like the policy Trump announced 
last August, “prevents service by 
transgender individuals,” and the 
minor deviations from the complete 
categorical ban were not signifi cant 
enough to make it substantially dif-
ferent, Kollar-Kotelly concluded.
Kollar-Kotelly did, however, grant 
the government’s motion to par-
tially dissolve the injunction as it 
applies personally to Trump, and 
granted the motion to “dismiss the 
President himself as a party to this 
case.” Should the plaintiffs prevail 
on the merits, an injunction aimed 
at the Defense Department’s lead-
ership preventing the policy from 
taking effect will provide complete 
relief, she pointed out.
The plaintiffs had complained 
that removing Trump from the 
case as a defendant would under-
mine their attempt to discover the 
information necessary to make 
their case, but the judge wrote that 
“it would not be appropriate to re-
tain the President as a party to this 
case simply because it will be more 
complicated to seek discovery from 
him if he is dismissed. To the ex-
tent that there exists relevant and 
appropriate discovery related to the 
President, Plaintiffs will still be able 
to obtain that discovery despite the 
President not being a party to the 
case.”
In the Baltimore case, Magistrate 
Judge Copperthite this week issued 
a ruling granting in part the plain-
tiffs’ motion to compel discovery of 
deliberative materials regarding 
Trump’s July 2017 tweet, his Au-
gust 2017 memorandum, the “ac-
tivities of the DoD’s so-called panel 
of experts and its working groups” 
who put together the memorandum 
ultimately submitted by Mattis to 
the president in February, and de-
liberative materials regarding that 
Implementation Plan and the presi-
dent’s subsequent March memo-
randum, “including any participa-
tion or interference in that process 
by anti-transgender activists and 
lobbyists.”
Copperthite, noting that a mo-
tion is pending before Judge Garbis 
to dismiss Trump as a defendant 
in the case, declined to rule on the 
government’s request for a protec-
tive order that would shield the 
president from having to respond 
to discovery requests directed to 
him, “pending the resolution of the 
motion” before Garbis. Cooperthite 
wrote that “no interrogatories or 
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document requests will be direct-
ed to President Trump as a party, 
but may be directed to other par-
ties pursuant to this Memorandum 
Opinion. If the Motion to Dismiss 
is denied, the Court will revisit the 
issue of the protective order as to 
President Trump.”
Cooperthite faced a practical di-
lemma in dealing with the govern-
ment’s requests to shield Trump 
from discovery.
“On July 27, 2017, President 
Trump tweeted transgender per-
sons would no longer be able to 
serve in the military and as for any 
deliberative process, simply stated 
this policy occurred after consult-
ing with ‘my Generals and military 
experts,’” he wrote. “There is no evi-
dence to support the concept that 
‘my Generals and military experts’ 
would have the information Plain-
tiffs request. There is no evidence 
provided to this Court that ‘my 
Generals and military experts’ are 
identifi ed, in fact do exist, or that 
they would be included in document 
requests and interrogatories pro-
pounded to the Executive Branch, 
excluding the President. By tweet-
ing his decisions to the world, the 
President has, in fact, narrowed the 
focus of Plaintiffs’ inquiries to the 
President himself. The Presidential 
tweets put the President front and 
enter as the potential discriminat-
ing offi cial.”
Cooperthite, here, is raising the 
real question as to whether discov-
ery that doesn’t include Trump is at 
all meaningful, since the ultimate 
legal question in the litigation is the 
intent of the government in adopt-
ing the ban which is, at bottom, 
the president’s intent. On the other 
hand, discovery directed at Trump 
raises serious questions about 
separation of powers and the tradi-
tional respect for the confi dentiality 
of internal White House policy de-
liberations, as Kollar-Kotelly noted 
in her ruling.
“So many factors are unknown 
at this juncture in the litigation,” 
wrote Copperthite. “It is unknown 
whether Plaintiffs can obtain the 
information necessary from the 
non-Presidential discovery to defi ne 
the ‘intent’ of the government with 
respect to the transgender ban. 
Defendants offer as an alternative, 
a stay of discovery with respect to 
the President, until the Motion to 
Dismiss the President as a party 
is decided. If the President, as the 
discriminating offi cial, tweeted his 
transgender ban sua sponte as al-
leged, this Court sees no alterna-
tive to obtaining the intent of the 
government other than denying 
the protective order with respect to 
President Trump.”
However, he wrote, precedents 
“instruct this Court to give defer-
ence to the executive branch be-
cause ‘occasions for constitutional 
confrontation between the two 
branches should be avoided when-
ever possible.’”
So Copperthite decided to put 
off deciding the protective order 
issue until after Judge Garbis de-
cides whether to dismiss Trump as 
a party, but for now will order the 
defendants only to comply with dis-
covery requests directed to defen-
dants other than Trump, Secretary 
Mattis, and the secretaries of the 
individual military branches.
The possibility that Trump will 
be ordered to submit to questioning 
under oath in at least one of these 
cases remains a reality, but any 
attempt by the plaintiffs to do so 
would undoubtedly arouse spirited 
opposition from the Defense Depart-
ment, offi cially based on claims of 
privilege, but realistically due to the 
likelihood that Trump would per-
jure himself under such question-
ing. Recall the historical precedent: 
The House of Representatives voted 
to impeach President Bill Clinton 
based, in part, on the charge that 
he committed perjury during ques-
tioning before a grand jury by the 
special counsel investigating his af-
fair with Monica Lewinski. At least 
in that case, the House considered 
presidential perjury to be an im-
peachable offense. 
Plaintiffs in the Seattle case, 
Karnoski v. Trump, in which the 
president remains a defendant, are 
represented by Lambda Legal and 
pro bono attorneys from Kirkland & 
Ellis. Plaintiffs in the DC case, Jane 
Doe 2 v. Trump, are represented 
by the National Center for Lesbian 
Rights, GLBTQ Legal Advocates & 
Defenders (GLAD), and pro bono at-
torneys from Wilmer Cutler Picker-
ing Hale & Dorr LLP and Foley Hoag 
LLP. Plaintiffs in the Baltimore case, 
Stone v. Trump, are represented by 
the American Civil Liberties Union, 
the ACLU of Maryland, and pro 
bono attorneys from Covington & 
Burling LLP.
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